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NotThatKevin · 2003-09-10, 12:02 PM

Here is an interesting cut and paste for you to read

It was indeed necessary for a United States Court of Appeals to take this issue head on in Sundance Associates, Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804 (10th Cir., 1998). The Tenth Circuit Court invalidated language contained in Part 75 which attempted to expand the scope of Section 2257 so that it would reach the re-publishers of photographs.

Sundance Associates published five swingers' magazines which reprinted reader-submitted photos, some of them apparently depicting actual sexual conduct. Fearing criminal liability under Section 2257, it brought sought for declaratory judgment declaring that the Attorney General's provisions, so expanding the scope of the Section as to make them what the Regulations called a "secondary producer", were invalid. 28CFR Ch. 1 Section 75.1 (c) (2) defined a "secondary producer" as any person who, among other things, publishes matter that contains a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct. Sundance argued that the Regulations did not simply implement the will of Congress for enforcement and application of the statute, but, contradicting limitations on the kind of production which was controlled by the Statute, it improperly added activity and persons to the reach of the law.

The trial court ruled for Sundance and invalidated the "secondary producer" provisions and the Attorney General took an Appeal to the Tenth Circuit.

The Tenth Circuit held that the Attorney General's interpretation of Congress's definition of "produces" "flies in the face of the statutory language". It gets stronger. The Tenth Circuit observed that the Attorney General was "twisting words to reach a result it prefers" rather than interpreting any verbal ambiguity with accepted alternative meanings. The court struck down that part of the Regulation that reached publishers who had no contact with the performers and had not contracted for the work to be produced. (To perhaps state it with too much exactitude for an article directed at a general readership, the Tenth Circuit struck the words "other than those activities identified in paragraphs (c) (1) and (2) of this section", words which had the effect of putting all publishers of explicit material back into a definition that otherwise would have excluded all persons who "did not hire, contract for, manage, or otherwise arranging for the participation of the depicted performers

2003-09-10, 12:02 PM	#10
NotThatKevin Well you know boys, a nuclear reactor is a lot like women. You just have to read the manual and press the right button Join Date: Sep 2003 Location: Australia Posts: 155	Here is an interesting cut and paste for you to read It was indeed necessary for a United States Court of Appeals to take this issue head on in Sundance Associates, Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804 (10th Cir., 1998). The Tenth Circuit Court invalidated language contained in Part 75 which attempted to expand the scope of Section 2257 so that it would reach the re-publishers of photographs. Sundance Associates published five swingers' magazines which reprinted reader-submitted photos, some of them apparently depicting actual sexual conduct. Fearing criminal liability under Section 2257, it brought sought for declaratory judgment declaring that the Attorney General's provisions, so expanding the scope of the Section as to make them what the Regulations called a "secondary producer", were invalid. 28CFR Ch. 1 Section 75.1 (c) (2) defined a "secondary producer" as any person who, among other things, publishes matter that contains a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct. Sundance argued that the Regulations did not simply implement the will of Congress for enforcement and application of the statute, but, contradicting limitations on the kind of production which was controlled by the Statute, it improperly added activity and persons to the reach of the law. The trial court ruled for Sundance and invalidated the "secondary producer" provisions and the Attorney General took an Appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit held that the Attorney General's interpretation of Congress's definition of "produces" "flies in the face of the statutory language". It gets stronger. The Tenth Circuit observed that the Attorney General was "twisting words to reach a result it prefers" rather than interpreting any verbal ambiguity with accepted alternative meanings. The court struck down that part of the Regulation that reached publishers who had no contact with the performers and had not contracted for the work to be produced. (To perhaps state it with too much exactitude for an article directed at a general readership, the Tenth Circuit struck the words "other than those activities identified in paragraphs (c) (1) and (2) of this section", words which had the effect of putting all publishers of explicit material back into a definition that otherwise would have excluded all persons who "did not hire, contract for, manage, or otherwise arranging for the participation of the depicted performers