Here is some interesting reading regarding the 2257.
Here is the actual statute
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/2257.html
In 1998 the DOJ changed its regulations, in particular its definition of producer (primary and secondary). The 10th circuit court of appeals ruled against the DOJ. Here is the ruling and is actually very readable.
http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/1998/03/96-1501.htm
I am no lawyer, but the court seems to have indicated that the DOJ can not impose regulations under the statute to those specifically excluded by the statute.
The text from the statute under question is:
"the term ''produces'' means to produce, manufacture, or publish any book, magazine, periodical, film, video tape or other similar matter and includes the duplication, reproduction, or reissuing of any such matter, but does not include mere distribution or any other activity which does not involve hiring, contracting for[,] managing, or otherwise arranging for the participation of the performers depicted..."
An excerpt from the 10th circuit court follows:
"The Attorney General's regulatory definition of producer follows the statute in establishing a class of individuals and organizations possibly subject to the record keeping requirements, but it fails to exclude persons from the class that the statute requires. The regulation conditions its exclusion of those "not involve[d in] the hiring, contracting for, managing, or otherwise arranging for the participation of the depicted performers" to persons who are not a primary or secondary producer. 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(4)(iii). The statute makes no such condition. This is not a minor matter, because, as will be explained in detail below, the practical effect of the regulatory scheme is that the exclusion cannot be applied to anyone. "[A]n agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear." MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994). An agency's rulemaking power is not "the power to make law," it is only the "'power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.'" Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir.) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (further quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987).
Attempting to justify its regulation, the government urges upon this court a tortured reading of the statute. The government contends the second part of § 2257(h)(3), beginning with "does not include mere distribution," was actually intended to broaden the scope of the statute. The government's approach leads us down a path toward Alice's Wonderland, where up is down and down is up and words mean anything. The words "but does not include ... any other activity which does not involve hiring, contracting for[,] managing, or otherwise arranging for the participation of the performers depicted," the argument goes, were not intended to "not include" anyone listed above, but were actually intended by implication only to include more activities in the definition. This is too much of a stretch. In reviewing statutes, courts do not assume the language is imprecise, as the government would have us do. See United States v. LaBonte, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1997). Rather, we assume that in drafting legislation, Congress says what it means. Id. This is not a case of verbal ambiguity presenting accepted alternative meanings; it is one of an agency twisting words to reach a result it prefers. Although § 2257(h)(3) was poorly drafted and should never be used as a model of the English language, its intent is clear to this court. "
In terms of what forms of ID are acceptable, the statute defines these at:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/1028.html
The relevant excerpt is:
"the term ''identification document'' means a document made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a State, political subdivision of a State, a foreign government, political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals"
It would appear the DOJs proposed acceptable IDs are in conflict with the actual language of the statute.
Another website with intersting comments upon the proposed regulations and suggested text for those who wish to comment is at:
http://www.avnonline.com/index.php?P...tent_ID=186841